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This study of Ireland’s gender contract at the end of the 1950s is a country-specific 
analysis of gender regime change at the level of the state. It is based primarily on Irish 
parliamentary debates for the years 1957 and 1958, the point at which Ireland embarked 
on a process of economic modernization. In describing the detail of this gender system, 
it provides a benchmark against which the reforms of the late 1960s and 1970s can be 
measured. It also points to two salient features of a state’s gender regime that may be 
applicable in other situations: first, the comparative ‘stickiness’ of the gender contract 






After a period of retrenchment and the closing down of political protest, society again 
appears to be entering a period of widespread social dissent and the beginning of a 
radical critique of political, economic and social structures on an international scale. This 
article looks back to a similar period, more than 40 years ago, when the complacency of 
society was due to be shattered by the rebellions and new social movements of the 
1960s. By situating itself at the end of the 1950s, its purpose is to define Ireland’s 
gender system prior to the point of change and use this country-specific analysis to 
contribute to the growing debate on ‘gender regime’ change at the level of the state. 
 
Having missed out on the postwar boom, in 1958 the Irish government adopted the 
Programme for Economic Expansion, beginning a selfconscious modernization of many 
aspects of economic policy. This opening up of the country to foreign direct investment, 
and the resulting economic growth, is widely used as a historical cut-off, as it also 
marked the beginning of a period of social change (Horgan, 1997; Lee, 1989). For 
women’s rights, the turning point does not come until the early 1960s (Connolly, L., 
1996), as the state’s views on gender at the beginning of the process of ‘modernization’ 
remained trenchantly conservative, with no concept that any fundamental improvement 
in the legal and social status of women was either necessary or desirable. At this time, 
the attitudes to women and women’s rights held by state elites were still influenced by 
the philosophy and policy demands articulated by first-wave feminism and the resulting 
policy compromises from that period of strong social movement activity. In the absence 
of any fresh injection of new political ideas on gender relations, the theoretical 
framework and language provided by first-wave feminism continued to frame the context 
for political debate on the gendered aspects of public policy in the 1950s. 
 
In spite of its conservatism, Ireland in the 1950s was not unusual in the comparative 
context of Western Europe. The intensity with which pre-war gender norms were re-
established negated the potential impact of women’s wartime experience as workers, 
members of liberation movements and as heads of households. The difference in the 
political experiences of Ireland and the rest of Western Europe, which had in some ways 
been widened by the war, converged again in the 1950s as Western Europe combined 
rapid economic growth and industrial development with traditional views on gender and 
the family dominating policy discourses, that resulted in the majority of women becoming 
engaged in housewifery rather than paid employment (Oláh, 1998: 52). After the 
upheavals of war, the family was seen as a bastion against political extremes and the 
repository of moral and social good (Ostner, 1993: 97). Women as carers in the home 
were essential to this vision of the family and states encouraged ‘the emergence of 
strong ideological currents exalting women’s role as homemakers’ (Ergas, 1982: 258). 
The new social welfare systems that were developed in the postwar years were also 
imbued with this gender ideology sharing the basic assumption that ‘women provided 
care, generally in the private sphere of the home and were financially dependent on 
men’ (Kofman and Sales, 1996: 36). Across postwar Europe, employers and labour 
organizations concluded an employment bargain that ‘embedded a male breadwinner 
gender contract’ that compromised women’s position and standardized ‘employment 
contracts around the needs, interests and authority of men’ (Gottfried, 2000: 236). 
Although the detail of public policy varied, the general experience of women in Western 
Europe shared common themes: family law regimes invested authority in the husband 
and women’s access to employment was curtailed (Kaplan, 1992). 
 
Hirdman1 (cited in Duncan, 1994: 1186–8) describes society as being based on a 
‘gender contract’, which is the implicit agreement between the  sexes that sets out the 
rules that determine gender behaviour and assigns men and women their different roles. 
Similarly Barriteau (1998: 188, 191) describes a ‘gender system’ as ‘a network of power 
relations’ based on ‘complex systems of personal and social relations through which 
women and men are socially created and maintained and through which they gain 
access to, or are allocated, status, power and material resources’. Through its policy 
regime, the state participates in the creation and maintenance of the ‘gender contract’ or 
‘gender regime’ and that ‘gender regime’ is the result of social struggles and is linked to 
the wider gender order of society (Connell, 1990: 523). For Connell, the fact that the 
state embodies gender in this way gives it cause and capacity to ‘do’ gender, that is to 
regulate society’s gender order and this regulatory activity inevitably involves the 
transformation of gender categories. As the state and society is constantly changing, 
pressures for change develop in the gender order and it is these points of crisis that 
allow new political possibilities to emerge (Connell, 1990: 532). 
 
At the end of the 1950s the Irish state’s gender regime was on the eve of such a point of 
crisis. However, the state was unaware of impending change or any threat to the gender 
system over which it presided. The gender values embedded in the state’s policy regime 
were substantially those that had resulted from the last significant period of gender 
renegotiation, prior to the foundation of the state. The longevity of the gender contract 
that was a result of that period of social change, a facet of which was first-wave 
feminism, emphasizes the resilience of a gender contract once it is incorporated in a 
state’s public policy regime.  
 
Looking back to the 1950s from the vantage point of ‘post second-wave feminist’ society, 
there is a clear break between the social values of that period and those that existed 
even in the 1970s. This article proposes to explore the nature of the Irish state’s gender 
regime prior to the beginning of its renegotiation in the 1960s. It does this through an 
analysis of the debates on a cluster of policy initiatives between 1956 and 1958 that 
focused on women’s status and social roles in the two key areas that defined the gender 
regimes throughout Western Europe: women’s status in family law and their access to 
employment. The state’s construction of marriage and women’s place in the family is 
defined in the debate on the Married Women’s Status Act (1957). The place allotted to 
women in employment and the public sphere, and male fears of the consequences of 
women overstepping this allotted role can be seen in the debates on the 1958 Garda 
(Police) Act (which introduced women police officers) and in the discussion on the 
dropping of the marriage bar for primary school teachers in the same year. 
 
THE IMPACT OF ‘FIRST-WAVE FEMINISM’ 
 
At the time of the foundation of the new Irish state in 1922, Irish society had come 
through a period of considerable social change, which resulted in long-term gains for 
women that could be seen in access to education and new employment opportunities, 
especially for young, single women. For Irish feminists in the early decades of the 20th 
century, the case for enhancing the status of women was based primarily on a strong 
idea of gender difference, the unique contribution of women to society (and potentially to 
public life) and the need to place an equal value on male and female attributes. A 
minority view, articulated by activists such as Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, Constance 
Markievicz and Margaret Skinnider, placed a stronger emphasis on equality: that is, a 
form of equal citizenship that draws on the similarity between men and women and the 
fact they can perform the same citizenship duties and public roles (Connolly, E., 1994). 
Irish feminists sought the reform of family law, to give wives and mothers protection and 
an equal voice in family decisionmaking. Employment for married women, except those 
forced through ‘necessity’ to work, was not an issue because of the importance placed 
on women’s domestic and mothering role. For those who did not choose motherhood, 
first-wave feminists sought access to employment and the public sphere and equality 
before the law. 
 
From the 1920s, a strengthened discourse on femininity and motherhood dominated 
public life swamping the discourse on women’s citizenship that had been fostered by 
first-wave feminism, indicating the limits of the renegotiated gender regime (Valiulis, 
1994: 86–8). The retreat from the tenets of first-wave feminism was not confined to the 
Irish state. Internationally, there was a climate of deepening conservatism, which found 
expression in a conscious reversion to authoritarian family models and limitations on 
women’s access to employment and other public roles (O’Dowd, 1987). The 1937 
Constitution embodied the dominant gender values of the Irish state, in this conservative 
milieu, defining the role of women exclusively as that of mothers working within the 
home. The definition of women’s citizenship in the Constitution was deliberately narrow, 
it limited the equality given to women, to political equality – the right to vote and stand for 
election – the phrase ‘without distinction of sex’ having been deleted from the draft of 
Article 40.1 (Scannell, 1988: 124). The clause stating that all citizens were equal before 
the law was qualified with the words; ‘this shall not be held to mean that the State shall 
not in its enactments have due regard to difference in capacity, physical and moral, and 
of social function’. The Constitution, therefore, gave women no entitlement to equality 
and sanctioned the state’s policy regime, which limited women’s access to employment 
and treated married women as the legal inferiors of their husbands. 
 
Women in the new state became less visible in public life, and in the conservative, 
economically harsh atmosphere of the 1920s and 1930s there appeared to be little 
energy for campaigning and few avenues open for political dissent. In spite of the 
contraction in the public space available to women, many of the women’s organizations 
which had been founded in the early years of the century, or whose members were from 
the generation 
of women who had been politically active before 1922, continued to campaign on 
women’s rights issues. The Irish Women’s Citizens Association,  founded in 1923 in the 
aftermath of the suffrage campaign, and the Women Graduates’ Association, founded in 
1902, participated in setting up the Joint Committee of Women’s Societies and Social 
Workers, in response to the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which in 
addition to banning contraception, dealt with the control of prostitution, and the age of 
sexual consent. The new organization lobbied for policy changes that had formed part of 
the agenda of first-wave feminism, including: a female police force; women probation 
officers; jury service for women on the same basis as men; and the raising of the age of 
sexual consent for women to 18 (Maddock, 1996: 115). These organizations also 
lobbied against the Conditions of Employment Act 1936, that limited women’s access to 
employment, and the clause in the 1937 Constitution that defined women as ‘mothers in 
the home’. 
 
The Irish Housewives’ Association (IHA), founded in 1942, saw itself as an integral part 
of a network of women’s organizations that had their roots in pre-independence Ireland 
and especially in the suffrage campaign (Tweedy, 1992: 18–20). Lagerkvist (1997) 
describes the ‘resistance’ to the gender regime of the 1950s offered by the Irish 
Housewives’ Association. Although she does not make the point explicitly, implicit in her 
analysis of the IHA is the strong connection between their ideas and language and 
those of first-wave feminism. Present among the ‘melange of subjects’ in their magazine, 
is an ‘emphasis on women’s work in the public sphere’, together ‘with a desire to revalue 
the traits of housewife’ (Tweedy, 1992: 121). The women of the IHA, ‘while seeking to 
expand their role did not endeavour to abandon them’ and they did not engage in a 
fundamental critique of the existing gender regime (Tweedy, 1992: 28). 
 
The Irish state, like first-wave feminism, based its public policy on a strong belief in 
gender difference, but in its case it was a difference based on male superiority not a 
difference of equals. The state strongly discouraged married women from working and 
allotted an employment role for single women as it was envisaged that some women  
would never marry and would continue to pursue their careers. But in line with society’s 
assessment of the comparative status of men and women, career paths even for single 
women were narrow and poorly paid. For many women, including married and widowed 
women, and especially those with children, working was an absolute necessity  
unrecognized in public policy. In spite of this reality, the state refused to recognize in its  
public policy that alternative models of family life existed, in case doing so would weaken 
commitment to the family based exclusively on a husband/father ‘breadwinner’ with a 
stay-at-home wife/mother. The focus of state policy was primarily on the ‘middle-class’, 
‘middle-income’ family that conformed to this ideal model. The fact that in some families 
married women would be forced to work either because of their subordinate class 
position or comparative poverty was not perceived by the state to pose a significant 
challenge to the gendered basis of its policy regime. In the case of middle-class women, 
this was because the numbers forced by necessity to work was likely to be small. 
Middle-class women working through economic necessity (usually widows or ‘deserted 
wives’) were frequently employed as ‘an act of charity’ in the civil service and also by 
other employers usually in office work and other administrative roles.2 As they were 
generally employed in a long-term temporary capacity, with none of the benefits of 
permanent full-time employment, this solution did not threaten the state’s wider 
employment policies. Similarly, because employment for working-class women was 
predominantly unskilled and of low status,3 it did not present a challenge either to the 
power structure of the gender contract or to male trade union interests.  
 
As the state envisaged a narrow role for women’s employment and did not accord it any 
positive policy significance, female employment was not mentioned in the Irish 
government’s 1958 Programme for Economic Expansion and women were not included 
in training programmes for ‘manpower’ policy. The state had no conception that is should 
intervene in the labour market to protect women’s employment rights. In fact the reverse 
was true: the state was primarily concerned with curbing women’s employment, both 
from an ideological perspective and from the practical proposition that by reducing 
female employment the government might increase male employment. Similarly, in spite 
of the expression of the centrality to the state of motherhood and women’s role in the 
family, contained in the Constitution, and the enforced domesticity of women implicit in 
its policy regime, the state had no comprehension that it should accord support to, or 
protect, women as mothers. 
 
The most visible reform that the state had conceded from the agenda of first-wave 
feminists was the right to vote and stand in elections. Since the 1920s, women’s voice in 
the public sphere had remained muted, as few women went forward for election 
reflecting the limitations placed on women in society more generally. Other major 
concessions were access to education – even at this stage Irish girls had a good 
standard of education measured against European norms – and employment 
opportunities especially for single women, although these were limited by the capacity of 
the Irish economy, as well as gender-based discrimination. Although the state was 
reluctant to interfere with men’s authority in the family, that authority had to be exercised 
within  legal parameters that had not existed at the beginning of the 20th century. For 
example, by the 1950s widows could use the courts to claim maintenance from their 
husband’s estate even if that estate had been left elsewhere. Women’s rights 
organizations continued to lobby the state, drawing on a well-established agenda: 
arguing for the recognition of the importance of motherhood by giving women legal 
equality in the family; seeking the protection of women in vulnerable circumstances 
through the introduction of women police officers; and campaigning for equal pay as a 
public expression of the equal status of women and of feminine values. 
 
Although the state was in the process of radically altering its economic policy in the late 
1950s, there was no indication among state elites that the assumptions on gender which 
underpinned public policy were also being questioned. Three key policy debates in the 
period 1957–9 which touch on the critical areas of family law and women’s employment 
give no indication of impending reform. The debates on the Married Women’s Status Act 
1957, the Garda Act 1958 and the dropping of the marriage bar for national school 
teachers demonstrate how hegemonic and unchallenged these views on gender were, 
as the state initiated a programme of change in other policy areas. 
 
GENDER AND MARRIAGE 
 
The Married Women’s Status Bill (1956) was a limited and fundamentally conservative 
piece of legislation that consolidated into one act the various laws regarding the property 
rights and the ability to contract, of married women. Its aim was to prevent married 
women and married couples from engaging in fraud using the legal restraints on married 
women’s ability to enter into legally binding contracts. The Bill ensured that a married 
woman would be able to acquire, hold and dispose ‘of any property and would be 
subject to the law relating to bankruptcy and to the enforcement of judgements and 
orders as if she were unmarried’ (CSW, 1972: 173). This law gave married women, for 
the first time, a separate legal identity to that of their husbands and it was this fact that 
caused heated political debate. As all the major parties in parliament supported the aims 
of the proposed legislation, the debate was in a sense a contrived one in that the 
opposition, according to Irish parliamentary culture, was obliged to find fault with 
government proposals. What is significant about the debate is the grounds on which 
Fianna Fáil (the largest party in the state – a populist party with cross-class support), the 
opposition party at this time, chose to criticize the Bill – its potential impact on the 
stability of the family and the institution of marriage. Conservative members of the 
coalition government parties, Fine Gael (a centre-right party drawing support from large 
farmers and the business classes) and Labour (linked to the trade union movement but 
small and conservative by European standards), also queried the potential, unintended 
impact of the Bill. The government defended its proposal by explaining why the Bill 
would not have the effect on the existing form of marriage that deputies feared while 
asserting their agreement with the meaning ascribed to marriage by the majority of 
contributors to the debate. 
 
The Bill gave married women an independent legal status and therefore granted married 
couples the right to sue each other in a court of law, which had not previously been the 
case. It was the ‘social implications’ of this provision that caused most concern. Married 
women would have the right to use the courts to evict their husbands from property 
owned by them and also to use the courts in cases of slander and assault. It was these 
new rights that were considered capable of doing ‘inestimable damage’ and seriously 
weakening the institution of marriage,4 by fundamentally altering the balance of power 
between husband and wife. As one politician argued 
 
. . . certain legal rights exist already for the protection of the married women’s 
status. Here however we are opening the door entirely so that the husband and 
wife will now stand as two entirely different people in the eyes of the law . . . for 
the first time, we are providing the married woman with the temptation to bring 
her husband into court in a civil action when she might not think of it otherwise.5
 
At the bottom of this fear of civil actions was the belief that couples would be able to use 
the courts to obtain a de facto separation. Deputy Thomas Finlay of Fine Gael, later to 
become chief justice, stated 
 
. . . in the attempt to tidy up the law we may create a situation in which husbands 
and wives will find it easier to part, or easier to follow the temptation to part, than 
they do at present in this country.6  
 
The idea that married couples could sue to have their spouse ejected from their 
property, even if that property was the family home, appeared to some to be introducing 
a form of separation, given that marriage was based at that time on an absolute right to 
cohabit. This right was extended to wives by virtue of their dependency (maintenance 
could only be ensured if the women was living ‘under her husband’s protection’) and to 
husbands because of their right to consortium (a man’s right to cohabit and have a 
sexual relationship with his wife). If a husband was free to eject his wife from the family 
home that he owned, the right of married women to occupation of the family home was 
jeopardized. If a wife could have her husband evicted from the family home, it would 
make the husband’s legal right to ‘consortium’ unenforceable in those cases. Fears of 
these outcomes were countered by the government’s argument that although this Bill 
gave freedom to sue, existing defences such as the right of the wife to occupation of the 
family home and the husband’s right to consortium were not being removed and would 
take precedence over this new right, therefore, court action in those cases would be 
unlikely to prove successful.7
 
It was debated whether the existence or absence of the right of married couples to sue 
each other would be most likely to preserve marriages, acting as a safety valve to 
defuse marital conflict that could result in separation.8 This view was countered by the 
opposition with the argument that 
 
If it is easy for a wife to come into court, instead of its being a safety valve at a 
lower level than the ordinary separation business . . . it will wind up with a 
separation and it should not be made easier for her to do that.9
 
The key issues on which it was envisaged that wives might use this new legal right 
against their husbands, and therefore the major threat to the marriage contract, was 
physical and verbal abuse (which may be equated with mental abuse). Such abuse was 
accepted as an inevitable, if undesirable, part of marriage. That the courts might, 
through this Bill, be required to deal with abuse and violence in the family was perceived 
as a direct attack on men’s authority and privileged position in the family. Throughout the 
parliamentary debate there was an acceptance of ‘domestic violence’ and a total failure 
on the part of politicians to equate it with other forms of assault, illustrated by the claim 
that the Bill was dangerous because it allowed women to bring their husbands into court 
on issues ‘which would not of themselves constitute grounds for a legal separation’, for 
example a single assault.10
 
The government pointed out that very few women had made use of the existing law by 
‘instituting criminal proceedings against husbands for  assault’ and asked 
 
. . . from where does this apprehension come that there will be resort to the 
courts for, say, minor assaults . . . merely because we say a wife can sue her 
husband for torts of the personal violence type or defamation, it does not follow 
that our courts will be cluttered up with women who are supposed to be living in 
harmony with their husbands revealing to the public that they have been subject 
to violence for a long time and been defamed by their husband over many years. 
That is far removed from reality. The fact that we lay it down that they can go to 
court will not be regarded by these people [married women subjected to violence 
by their husbands] as an encouragement to go to court.11
 
In emphasizing that in spite of the existence of domestic violence it was unlikely to 
become more evident through the courts, the government indicated its preference was to 
keep such matters in the private sphere of the individual family. A view that was shared 
by deputies from Fianna Fáil, who on the question of whether or not assaults by 
husbands should be brought to court stated ‘if the whole world knows about it, it will be 
much worse’ and that ‘it is much better to have them fight at home’.12
 
The acceptance of violence against women in marriage as part of the gender contract 
was matched by an acceptance of women’s extreme economic dependency that 
reinforced their vulnerability in an abusive marriage. In the course of the debate, the 
gendered property relations that were at the heart of the marriage contract was vividly 
described. 
 
One important part of the marriage ceremony is that the husband gives his wife 
the right to his property or goods. Of course, to a large extent, in practice, that is 
nonsense nowadays because it does not mean that the wife gets all the 
husband’s investments or anything like that, but it does mean that she gets very 
great rights in many ways to his property, to live in his house and use his 
things.13
 
It is not the extreme economic dependency of the wife in this view of marriage that was 
seen to be a problem, but the fact that if a wife is given a measure of legal individuality 
the existing law which protects her, albeit totally dependent, position in the family may 
cease to be even a limited safeguard. Concern for the impact of the proposed legislation 
on the welfare of married women was motivated by support for the existing 
arrangements and a disinclination to give married women any additional rights or new 
forms of protection. Similarly, concern for the maintenance of male authority in marriage 
and in particular for male property rights was also raised when the impact of the Bill on 
succession law was discussed. Under succession law in the 1950s, the estate of a 
married woman automatically devolved onto her husband, while a woman could be 
disinherited by her husband. In the course of this debate, the political parties raised the 
fear that men might now be disinherited by their wives and not the real hardship already 
suffered by many women. The government was quick to assure deputies that the new 
provisions would in no way affect the existing legislation on inheritance.14
 
The view of marriage that emerges in this debate is not primarily based on affection or 
on mutual respect; instead its core values are centred on male property ownership, male 
authority and the permanency of the marriage contract. The male politicians participating 
in this debate were aware that the gender contract that underpinned the state and its 
public policy regime was one of male privilege, and that to unpick that privileged position 
would also necessitate the unpicking of the existing social  order including access to 
property and resources. Throughout the debate, it is clear that deputies are concerned 
with the maintenance of male rights against insidious female encroachment. It is 
constantly women and not men who are described as likely to frustrate the real purpose 




GENDER AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
State policy on women in the labour market was defined by the same attitudes to gender 
that shaped the views of the state elite on marriage. Restrictions on women’s 
employment included marriage bars (the compulsory retirement of women on marriage), 
restrictive trade union practices and gender-differentiated pay. At the end of the 1950s, 
the idea that a government could or should intervene in the labour market to prevent 
direct discrimination against women did not exist, this non-interventionist approach was 
justified in terms of the absolute necessity of the state to support the ‘freedom to contract 
and the freedom to employ’.15
 
There was also a high level of antagonism to married women working based on the 
belief that such women should not work, partly because their primary role was domestic, 
and partly because in a ‘job scarce’ economy a working married women would be 
‘depriving other people’ [that is men or single women] of employment’.16 Women’s 
organizations had maintained a low-key campaign in support of equal pay from the 
foundation of the state but their arguments found little resonance in the economic and 
social climate that prevailed in the 1950s.17  In its attitude to women and employment, 
the state had the support of the Catholic Church, whose social teaching at this time fully 
supported the idea of paying men, as the natural head of the family, more than women. 
Equal pay was considered justifiable only in limited circumstances where men and 
women were doing exactly the same job and giving an ‘equal return’ to the employer, 
essentially to prevent cheap female labour from undercutting male employment.18
 
Internationally, marriage bars had been widespread in the inter-war years and had been 
abandoned in the postwar period for economic, not ideological reasons. Some form of 
marriage bar that limited or prevented the employment of married women became 
common across Europe and in the United States during the economic depression that 
followed the First World War. In the United States ‘marriage bars’ were initiated between 
1900 and the 1930s, when they became a method of rationing scarce jobs (Goldin, 
1990: 6). In England, the civil service operated a marriage bar until the Second World 
War (Sanderson, 1986: 151) and in Germany a similar ban survived into the 1950s 
(Kolinsky, 1989: 49). In the postwar industrial world, marriage bars evaporated in the 
face of labour shortages. As a result, in the USA and across Europe there was a 
substantial increase in the number of married women working, with the vast majority of 
them involved in part-time employment, reflecting the primacy of women’s domestic role 
in the international gender regime. 
 
Ireland’s very high rates of unemployment and emigration meant that there was no 
economic pressure to create the space for married women to move into the workforce, 
even on a part-time basis, with the result that in the 1950s the marriage bar still affected 
many women working in industry19 and in the financial services as well as the semi-state 
sector and civil service. In fact the Civil Service Regulation Act of 1956 strengthened the 
marriage bar, by placing a legal requirement on the civil service to retire women from 
pensionable positions on marriage, replacing a more informal system. The retention of 
the marriage bar had the full support of the trade union movement, which resisted what it 
saw as the state undermining its own policy in order to save money by employing cheap 
labour in the form of married women in temporary or part-time positions.20
 
In 1958, the government put forward a minimalist proposal to introduce  women police 
officers, initially employing 12 such women on an experimental basis in Dublin. In spite 
of the modest aims of the legislation, the debate it produced clearly demonstrated the 
values that shaped the state’s gender regime and policies on women and employment. 
The introduction of policewomen had been a long-standing demand of Irish feminists 
and since the campaign on the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935, had formed part of 
the feminist agenda in the new state. The Coalition Government (1954–7) had 
considered introducing women police officers but had decided against it on the basis of 
cost. The idea was, however, revived by the incoming Fianna Fáil government in 1958. 
At the time of the introduction of the Garda Siochana (Police) Bill (1958) there were a 
small number of women already employed as police assistants, and there were also a 
number of local voluntary organizations whose aim was to assist the police with regard 
to female offenders and cases involving children. The recruitment of policewomen was 
seen as a formalization of this system. 
 
The government’s stated reason for recruiting policewomen was based on the need for 
women police officers ‘where sex offences are involved’21
and to take on 
 
. . . police duties, mainly in connection with matters affecting children and young 
women . . . in accordance with humanitarian principles . . . it is the intention that 
women police will be concerned primarily with these matters but that they will be 
given general police training and may be required to do any police duties which 
women would be capable of performing. (emphasis added)22
 
Although the limitations placed on policewomen were more restrictive than women’s 
rights campaigners would endorse, the primary reasons put forward by the government 
for introducing women police officers were clearly in line with the arguments made by  
the women’s organizations that had campaigned on this issue. The continuity of these 
arguments with first-wave feminist thinking is shown particularly by the contribution of 
the two Fianna Fáil women deputies (TDs). The suffragist movement in Ireland, from at 
least 1912, had lobbied for a women’s police force, even going as far as to organize 
women’s patrols in Dublin.23
 
Feminism at the time had among its major concerns the prevalence of prostitution and 
the physical and sexual abuse of women and children. They believed that women would 
be better able to assist women, girls and children than a male police force. Both of the 
women TDs who spoke welcomed the Bill, as members of the government party, but 
also pointed out that it was not particularly revolutionary; as Celia Lynch observed, not 
only did many countries have women police officers, but 
 
Women’s organizations have been fighting hard for the introduction of a women’s 
police force for many a long year, particularly the Joint Committee of Women’s 
Societies and Social Workers who have done Trojan work in getting the  
government to come to an agreement about the establishment of the force.24
 
The role of women police officers was linked to the idea of women having a vocation for 
social work and moral guidance, an idea which was also a strong tenet of first-wave 
feminism (Connolly, E., 1994) and the philanthropic movement of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries (Luddy, 1995). The women TDs believed that policewomen should not only 
deal with women and child offenders, but they should also ‘help advise girls in moral 
danger’.25 They emphasized the importance of the special skills of women that female 
police officers would have to bring to their role, arguing that because of the youth of the 
potential recruits they ‘should also be trained by women experts in dealing with women 
and children’ (emphasis added).26 It is evident from the debate that women were 
assumed to be suitable to act as policewomen because of inherent qualities they 
possessed as women, not because of their ability to acquire skills through training. It is 
on this basis that a number of deputies raised the issue of the proposed age of the 
recruits, seeking to have it raised from 20 to 25, believing that otherwise the recruits 
would not be sufficiently mature and would not yet have developed those innate skills 
that went with femininity.27
 
The two main negative potential aspects of the legislation, highlighted in the debate, 
were the possibility that female values could be allowed to shape policing attitudes, 
altering the public sphere, and that the rules applied to this new form of employment 
could be used as a means of weakening the existing employment relationship between 
men and women. Illustrating men’s fear of an altered public sphere, combined a strong 
theme of first-wave feminism, which had campaigned for the banning of alcohol, with a 
stereotyped view of women as being dogmatic and extreme, lacking men’s judgement 
and experience, a member of the government party warned that 
 
. . . women being what they are, you might get one of them who has a complete 
aversion to alcohol. She might be a certain type of social worker and very 
genuine, but she might spend most of her night duty raiding certain premises 
when the ordinary male member of the force would exercise his discretion.28
 
This view clearly expresses a disinclination to see women use their position as police 
officers to exercise authority over men. Fears were also expressed that the natural order 
of things would be upset by encouraging women to behave in a man-like manner and 
that the welfare of policewomen would be compromised by placing them in moral danger 
and 
subjecting them to the power of gossip which could lead to the loss of their character. 
This aspect of the opposition to the employment of policewomen became a minor 
controversy during the early 1960s, when strong opposition was expressed to 
policewomen posing as prostitutes during criminal investigations (Tobin, 1984: 98). 
 
The desire to strictly limit the role played by the policewomen to that of dealing with 
women and children was a major issue in the debate. This was not only a result of 
deputies’ resentment of the idea of women’s intrusion into the public sphere, but also 
concern that women’s cheap labour would be used to replace male officers. Deputies 
looked for assurance that policewomen would only be appointed to fulfil those duties that 
were unsuitable for male officers, and in particular that no clerical work that could be 
carried out by men should be performed by women.29 The question of whether there 
would be night duty for women, banned at that time under industrial legislation, was also 
raised.30
 
The government’s response to these concerns was to assure deputies that current 
employment practices would apply to policewomen in spite of what was perceived by 
many to be the atypical nature of their employment. However, the government countered 
this by pointing out that ‘the position is that we have not reached that happy state where 
equal pay for men and women has been accepted generally in the state’.31 In a similar 
vein, there were expressions of concern that the effect of the marriage bar would lead to 
money being wasted, training recruits who would only give a short service. As this issue 
was not raised as an attack on the marriage bar, it resulted in a discussion of possible 
vetting procedures at the interview stage that could weed out those women most likely to 
marry, one deputy even suggesting that ‘while recruits should not actually be 
horsefaced, they should not be too good-looking; they should be just plain women and 
not targets for marriage’.32 The government indicated its full support for the continuation 
of the marriage bar, viewing it as an inevitable fact of life the ‘marriage hazard is one of 
the things we have to accept’.33
 
In spite of the government’s firm defence of the marriage bar in the debates on the 
Garda Bill, they were, at the same time, in the midst of taking a decision to rescind it for 
primary school teachers. It was easier for the government to fit the idea of married 
women working as primary schoolteachers into its existing gender regime, without the 
fear that the concession would spill over into other areas of employment. As the 
marriage bar, for teachers, was a departmental regulation, and not a legal requirement, 
the decision to rescind it was taken by the Cabinet on the advice of the Minister for 
Education.34  The ban had been initially introduced in 1934 at the instigation of the 
government, against the wishes of the Irish National Teacher’s Organisation (INTO) and 
without the backing of the Catholic hierarchy, who had taken a neutral stand on the 
issue.35
 
The government had established a departmental committee to make policy 
recommendations on the pressing problem of teacher shortages in primary schools, 
especially those in rural areas. The committee recommended the dropping of the bar for 
primary school teachers, based on the fact that the costs of retaining married women as 
teachers was much smaller than the costs that would be involved in increasing the 
numbers of teacher training places to the point where the supply of teachers would 
match the demand including the wastage through retirement on marriage. Faced with 
this economic reality, the Department of Education conveniently came to the conclusion 
that teaching, more so than other professions, did not hinder a married women teacher 
from the ‘fulfilment of her duties and obligations in regard to the creation and 
maintenance of a home’.36  Primary teaching was promoted by the departmental 
committee as a female vocation that could be combined with housework. Women were 
considered particularly suitable to care for and educate young children and the relatively 
short working week and long holidays allowed women plenty of time for domestic 
activities. 
 
The strength with which the marriage bar was reaffirmed in the debate on the Garda Act 
(1958) indicated that, in general, the state remained wedded to the idea that married 
women should not work. The government’s removal of the marriage bar for national 
school teachers was opposed by the Labour Party as weakening this rule of general 
application, as a ‘dangerous precedent, that might spread to other women working in the 
State service’.37 Opposition to married women working was not just based on the belief 
that their primary role was the creation of a home, it was part of an attitude which gave 
precedence to men in all employment matters – because they were men. In the year the 
marriage bar for primary school teachers was dropped, the INTO objected to the 
appointment of a woman as principal of a Protestant primary school. The  INTO argued 
that because of the small number of such vacancies (because the majority of the 
population attended Catholic schools), the headship should have gone to a man, who 
may have family responsibilities, rather than to a single woman.38 In a trade union with a 
large number of female members, men were considered to have a greater entitlement to 
jobs and to promotion than even single women. This argument was not based on 
qualifications or suitability, but on men’s absolute entitlement to take priority. 
 
THE GENDERED STATE 
 
The Irish state’s gender regime that emerges from the foregoing analysis contains four 
key elements; a strong emphasis on gender difference; the hierarchical ranking of male 
and female; a clear division between the public sphere and the private/domestic sphere; 
and subjugation of individual rights within the family. The separate elements that made 
up the state’s gender regime were closely integrated, it was rightly feared that any 
attempt to unpick one of them would lead to the unravelling of the structure. It was for 
this reason that even minor reforms, such as the Married Women’s Status Act and the 
introduction of policewomen, were treated with suspicion and caution. These elements 
are familiar to sociological studies of gender and to feminist theory, and they have 
formed the basis of the analysis of women’s historic subordination. They also represent 
the ‘classic’ features of the male state of feminist literature (Bryson,  1992). This is not 
surprising given that academic feminism has its roots in the women’s movement that 
emerged in the late 1960s, primarily in opposition to the gender regime that had typified 
the state in the 1950s. 
 
As feminist theory developed from its social movement roots, a strong element of its 
discourse defined the state as male (or patriarchal),  described the structures and power 
relationships by which men as a group dominated women as a group and provided a 
powerful tool to analyse the continuity and universal aspects of women’s oppression 
(Kaplan, 1992; Walby, 1990). Theoretical models that describe the state as  patriarchal 
or structured by male dominance in this way are designed to analyse the negative, 
dominant/subordinate, relationship that exists between the sexes (Frazer and Lacy, 
1993: 33). However, they cannot successfully be used to describe other forms of 
relationship; in particular, they cannot be used to describe the diversity in the gender 
regime of states, or changes in an individual state’s gender regime. Such models tend to 
be static in their definition of the state, because they focus on the continuity of those 
aspects of the policy regime that maintain gender inequality even in circumstances 
where there have been significant changes in the form and actions of the state. This 
concern with continuity makes it difficult to deal with the state as a site of change, or to 
examine how the  gendered nature of the state changes over time. When the state is 
defined as male, women are cast in the role of victim or external challenger to the state, 
and not primarily as participants, leading to an overemphasis on the degree of 
separation between feminist movements and the society, including its political milieu, in 
which feminism develops. Seeing the state as constructed by gender and as 
participating in the development of the ‘gender contract’, rather than as simply male, 
allows the focus to be placed on the dynamic change in the state’s gender regime and 
the renegotiation of societies’ gender contracts. 
 
During the 1990s, feminist theory grappled with the problem of defining the gendered 
state and overcoming the limitations of the conceptualization of the state as male. 
Writing from a postmodernist perspective has rightly debunked the idea of a natural self 
and focused attention on the fundamentality of social or cultural constructs to the 
definition of human nature (Cooper, 1995; Sawer, 1996). This has been useful in 
directing attention away from political structures themselves and focusing on the 
ideology that animated them and that created them. Others have focused on the state as 
an entity, which is constituted within gender relations, and is the central 
institutionalization of gender power 
(Connell, 1990), or view the state’s policy output as both reflecting and simultaneously 
reinforcing an embedded gender contract (Gottfried, 2000). Duncan argues (1994: 1192) 
that by defining the state as gendered and instrumental in the construction of the gender 
contract, it allows for ‘actions by women and men’ that can alter the gender contract. The 
concept of patriarchy in this model is dynamic; a ‘varied structure, with different 
outcomes at different places and times’. Walby (2000: 537) extends this by defining the 
institutions of the state as one of a number of ‘gendered polities’ that together determine 
the dynamic of the gender regime. The concept of gender for the purposes of this 
analysis, is also useful, in that it can define male and female in binary opposition to each 
other; a change in either side of this equation prompts a response from the opposite 
side. Hence, viewing the state (or the institutions of the state) as gendered allows an 
analysis of dynamic change in the state’s concept of male and female, and also in the 
gendered relationship that underpins all social interaction and social structures 
(Marshall, 1994: 114). 
 
The renegotiation of gender values at the level of the state from the early 1960s onwards 
was not a smooth or gradual process of reform, but rather it was a transition that 
involved intense conflict over alternative gender regimes, as the state dealt with internal 
debate, pressure from interest groups and international developments. An understanding 
of the change that began in the 1960s needs a clear benchmark against which reform 
can be measured. An examination of the detail of the state’s gender regime at the end of 
the 1950s provides such a starting point. A key feature of the state’s policy regime in the 
1950s was the high degree of consensus that existed between the three main political 
parties. The Coalition government and the Fianna Fáil government that followed it in 
1957 were united in their policy position on family law and women’s employment. The 
disagreements that existed between the parties were superficial, arising primarily from 
the formal nature of parliamentary debates that allocated a specific length of time to 
opposition parties to speak on a Bill, and the adversarial character of those debates 
which required opposition parties find some reason to oppose even when they were in 
broad agreement with the government’s proposals. There is no evidence of any 
ideological or strategic differences between Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Labour on 
gender issues. In the debate on the Married Women’s Status Bill, in spite of a ‘phoney 
war’, both government and opposition expressed their total commitment to a ‘traditional’ 
form of marriage based on the authority of the husband, underpinned by men’s control of 
resources and the permanency of the marriage contract. The concerns expressed by the 
opposition parties, Fine Gael and Labour, that the introduction of policewomen would 
upset the male public sphere and lead other women to demand better conditions in the 
labour market were shared by the government. This was demonstrated by the limited 
nature of the government’s proposals, in particular the very limited role for which 
policewomen were being recruited, the imposition of sex-based pay differentials and the 
marriage bar. Even the Labour Party’s objections to the dropping of the marriage bar for 
primary school teachers did not represent a fundamental disagreement with the 
government, who made the policy decision as an act of expediency, which could be 
justified within the framework of the existing gender paradigm. This does not mean that 
there were no alternative voices in Irish society – even Fianna Fáil’s women TDs argued  
for a more positive assessment of women’s social roles – but that there was no political 
space in which demands such as equal pay could be voiced. At the end of the 1950s, 
the political parties in parliament presented a united front on gender relations, whole-
heartedly supporting the legal underpinning of male dominance and authority in the 
family and in economic life. Women’s rights organizations did not question that there 
was a strong gender difference and shared similar views on the importance of 
motherhood. They opposed what they saw as the unfair treatment of women, resulting 
from the failure of the state to value female attributes and its unnecessary restrictions on 
women’s roles and potential contribution. 
 
To the extent that the Irish state’s policy regime was still, in the 1950s, so strongly 
influenced by first-wave feminist thought indicates the episodic nature of gender regime 
change and the durability of a gender contract once it has been embedded in public 
policy. From the early 1960s, cracks began to appear in the hegemonic position of the 
state on gender, and differences between the political parties began to emerge 
(Connolly,   1998: 90). The pace of change increased rapidly from the late 1960s with 
the advent of second-wave feminism. The 1970s saw major reforms that fundamentally 
altered the gendered basis of the Irish state’s public policy paradigm. This represented a 
major shift of position in a relatively short space of time rather than a drawn out process 
of incremental change. The 1980s witnessed both a retreat from the radical atmosphere 
of the 1970s and also the continuation of reform within the new gender paradigm 
substantially created during the 1970s (Connolly, 1999: 87). The state at the end of the 
1950s was imbued with gender values that would have been understood and supported 
since the foundation of the state and represented the result of the preceding period of 
renegotiation in society’s gender contract. The policy reforms of the 1970s that replaced 
this gender regime – the introduction of the concept of gender-based legal equality and 
state support for women as mothers – was not a result of a slow build up of pressure. 
The new reforms did not form a continuum with the policies of the late 1950s, rather they 
represented a paradigmatic shift in the state’s policy response. This shift was primarily a 
product of the ideologies of the new social movements of the 1960s, including feminism, 
and of the underlying social change they represented. 
 
In Ireland, the debates that took place at the end of the 1950s, for all the  certainty of the 
opinions expressed, mark the end of an era. Within five years these gender values 
would begin to be challenged even in the state’s parliament – initially not in a radical way 
– but in a way that marked the beginning of a fundamental reappraisal of Irish society’s 





1. Duncan cites  and translates Hirdman’s work published in Swedish. For English language 
articles see Hirdman (1994, 1999). 
2. National Archives, DT S9278. There was no legal provision for divorce in Ireland but married 
couples could obtain legal separations. However, to be eligible for a very limited form of welfare 
provision married women who were not being supported by their husband had to prove they had 
been ‘deserted’ by him and that they had no knowledge of their husband’s current whereabouts. 
3. The attitude of the government to women’s low status employment is illustrated by a 
government memorandum from 1936, which states that while the marriage bar in the civil service 
applies to established posts it was also used in unestablished posts but not in every case. 
However, ‘the rule does not apply to subordinate positions such as office cleaners’ (National 
Archives, DT S9278). 
4. Dáil Debates, Vol. 160, c.1577, 28 November 1956. 
5. Seanad Debates, Vol. 47, cc.79–80, 16 January 1957. 
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11. Dáil Debates, Vol. 160, c.2289, 12 December 1956. 
12. Dáil Debates, Vol. 160, c.2287, 28 November 1956 and c. 1580, 12 December 1956. 
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17. National Archives, Department of Labour, W129, The Women’s Social and Progressive 
League and the Irish Housewives’ Association separately lobbied on the question of equal pay; 
notes of meetings on 27 November 1950 and 5 December 1950. 
18. National Archives, Department of Labour, W129. 
19. Conversation with women who were employed by Jacobs and Guinness in the 1960s. 
Women received a gratuity from the company, which was presented to them by a member of the 
senior management in a spirit of congratulations. 
20. Browne to de Valera, 11 December 1958, National Archives, DT S16319 A. 
21. Seanad Debates, Vol. 49, c.590, 4 June 1958. 
22. Dáil Debates, Vol. 168, c.599, 22 May 1958. 
23. The activities of this campaign are detailed in the pages of the suffrage newspaper the Irish 
Citizen. 
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35. National Archives, DT, S6231 C. Memorandum from the Department of Education to the 
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departmental committee set up by the minister to make recommendations on how the problem of 
untrained teachers in national schools might be solved. With one dissenter, they supported the 
ending of the marriage bar. 
36. National Archives, DT, S6231 C. Memorandum from the Department of Education to the 
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